Full Text of U.S.-Russia "123" Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

Today, President Bush submitted for Congressional review an agreement to broadly permit U.S.-Russia civil nuclear cooperation. The full text of this accord, known as a "123 agreement" after the section of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 that requires it, is available here.

Under U.S. law, the US-Russia 123 agreement will automatically enter into force after 90 days of continuous session, if Congress does not pass a law either to amend or block the agreement. Two bills -- H.R. 1400 (which has 325 co-sponsors and passed the House in a 397-to-16 vote last September) and S. 970 (which 71 out of 100 Senators have co-sponsored, but the consideration of which is being held up by at least one Senator) -- would block this agreement, but it remains unclear whether these bills will become law.

The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), where I work as a research fellow, offers some great resources for those who interested in understanding better the context in which this agreement will be reviewed. First, NPEC recently released The Next Phase of U.S.-Russian Civil Nuclear Relations: Opportunities, Risks and Choices, a backgrounder by me and NPEC executive director Henry Sokolski on the seismic changes-in-the-making to this bilateral nuclear relationship.

Second, NPEC provides an excellent selection of primary source documents relevant to this agreement:

• Full text of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation for Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (May 6, 2008)
• Fact Sheet on U.S.-Russia Agreement for Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation by U.S. Department of State (May 6, 2008)
• Statement by President Bush (May 6, 2008)
• Letter from Rep. Ed Markey (D-MA) to President Bush (May 1, 2008)
• Letter from House Energy and Commerce Committee chair John Dingell (D-MI) and House Energy Subcommittee chair Bart Stupak (D-MI) to President Bush (May 7, 2008)
• Letter from Sen. Norm Coleman (R-MN), Sen. Evan Bayh (D-IN) and 30 other Senators to President Bush (May 7, 2008)

More to follow.

AEI/NPEC Conference: The Crisis in Nonproliferation: Meeting the Challenge

On April 8, 2008, the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) co-hosted a day-long conference titled The Crisis in Nonproliferation: Meeting the Challenge. For more, check out the video or audio of the conference's proceedings.

The conference consisted of three panels. Panel I, "After Iran and North Korea: The Next Nuclear Challenges," featured James Acton of King's College London, Robert J. Einhorn of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Sharon Squassoni of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Bruno Tertrais of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, and was moderated by AEI's Danielle Pletka.

Panel II, "The Indian Nuclear Deal: What Should Be Done in 2008?," featured Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association, David Trachtenberg, and Rohit Tripathi of Young India, and was moderated by NPEC's Henry Sokolski.

Finally, panel III, "Beyond the NPT: What's Needed?," featured J. D. Crouch of the National Institute for Public Policy, George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and NPEC's Henry Sokolski, and was moderated by AEI's Danielle Pletka.

Click here for more.

House Foreign Affairs Committee and Secretary of State on Timely Warning and the NPT's Article IV

Good morning from Prague. The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) released today correspondence between the House Committee on Foreign Affairs (HCFA) and the US Secretary of State (SECSTATE) reaffirming that it is crucially important that any nuclear activity protected under the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons afford "timely warning" of possible diversions for military or unknown purposes.

For more on the legislative history of what "timely warning" requires, check out this 1988 essay by Leonard Weiss.

And for more on this topic, see NPEC's recently released edited volume, Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom, which includes my NPEC essay, "The NPT, IAEA Safeguards and Peaceful Nuclear Energy: An 'Inalienable Right,' but Precisely to What?"

Happy Birthday, NNPA of 1978

Today marks the 30th anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978 (Public Law 95-242).

Leonard Weiss on 'Timely Warning' in NNPA of 1978

The Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) is making available "The Concept of 'Timely Warning' in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978" by Leonard Weiss as primary-source background for NPEC's project on assessing the International Atomic Energy Agency's ability to safeguard peaceful nuclear energy.

Mr. Weiss, who worked for Sen. John Glenn for more than two decades, was the chief architect of the NNPA of 1978 and other legislation sponsored by Sen. Glenn. This essay was originally placed by Sen. Glenn in The Congressional Record of March 21, 1988, in order to establish the legislative intent of the law regarding what is meant by "timely warning" and thus which civil nuclear activities are -- and are not -- effectively safeguardable.

NPEC's Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom

The Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute just published the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center's Falling Behind: International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom. Edited by NPEC executive director Henry Sokolski, the volume includes essays by former IAEA deputy director general Pierre Goldschmidt, Woodrow Wilson School professor Frank von Hippel, former IAEA Action Team leader Garry Dillon, Edwin Lyman of the Union of Concerned Scientists, Tom Cochran of the National Resources Defense Council, Sokolski, and me.

IAEA's Latest on Iran's Nuclear Noncompliance

Via the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC), GOV/2008/4: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the IAEA Director General's latest report on Iran's noncompliant nuclear program. Earlier today, the Agency circulated this report to the IAEA's Board of Governors.

Update (10:52 AM ET): The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) just now posted GOV/2008/4. If David Albright, et al., post any follow-up analysis, I'll link to that.

Update (February 24, 2008, @ 1:17 PM ET): Here's an ISIS analysis of GOV/2008/4. Also worth checking out is Arms Control Wonk's analysis.

Kahn and Mann's "Ten Common Pitfalls" (1957)

Herman Kahn

At the RAND Corporation of the 1950s, perhaps no figure was larger (quite literally) than that of Herman Kahn (1922-1983).

Weighing in at over 350 lbs., Kahn joined RAND in the late 1940s. Educated in physics at UCLA and Caltech, and having served in the Army during World War Two, he initially participated in RAND research revolving around the physics and design of nuclear warheads. But in following decade, the scope of his work would come to include issues more directly related to nuclear strategy.

When I've interviewed people for my research on Albert Wohlstetter (1913-1997), a strategist who was also at RAND in the 1950s, the subject of Herman Kahn has sometimes come up. RAND alumni would often say that Kahn was worth learning about, not just to compare and contrast his research with that of Wohlstetter, or Bernard Brodie, or William W. Kaufmann, or Andrew Marshall, but also because Kahn himself was such a strange, unique personality. Indeed, descriptions of Kahn were typically peppered with words and phrases like "brilliant," "hilarious," "grotesque," "gregarious," "singular," "sometimes exasperating" and "larger than life."

To explain better Kahn's personality, many of his RAND-era colleagues would draw attention to his late-1950s lectures on what were at the time very unpopular, even inflammatory, subjects, such as nuclear war-fighting, and civil defense in the face of nuclear war. During these marathon-like lectures, which were sometimes spread out over several days, Kahn would use his mesmerizing, rapid-fire oratory and almost comical gesticulations to punctuate his controversial claims, often to the amusement, amazement and astonishment of the crowd. The success of these lectures led Kahn, with no small amount of prodding from his assistants, to publish On Thermonuclear War (1960) . This mammoth 400-page bestseller -- the title of which consciously alludes to Clausewitz's classic On War -- is in part a word-for-word anthology of his many sensational talks.

Kahn and Mann's Ten Common Pitfalls

Less known, though, are Kahn's reports and memos, many of which are available on the RAND Corporation's website. In my mind, one stands out:

Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann, Ten Common Pitfalls, RM-1937 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, July 17, 1957).

This research memorandum (hence its designation as "RM-1937") was intended to be a very preliminary draft of a chapter in Kahn and Mann's planned, but never completed, book, Military Planning in an Uncertain World. RM-1937 offers the book's provisional table of contents.

Ten Common Pitalls examines a series of methodological problems that often hamper or distort the work of policy analysts. Kahn and Mann's examination, however, is intended to be descriptive rather than analytical. In the introduction, they write that they hope RM-1937 will serve "as a sort of checklist" for analysts, or at least alert them "to the things to look for in an analysis." As a bonus, the research memorandum illustrated (literally) each pitfall with a drawing by Kahn. These drawing, reproduced below, are quite humorous and give a sparkling sense of Kahn's own wit and personality.

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Pitfall #1: Modelism. Kahn and Mann write: "We shall start by considering what is to many people, the heart and soul of Systems Analysis--the use and abuse of models. We have already explained that it is necessary to use idealized models which abstract essentials and make assumptions explicit. It is, however, a frequent pitfall to abuse this modeling by being more interested in the model than in the real world...." (To read more, click here.)

 

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Pitfall #2: Statistical Uncertainty. Kahn and Mann write: "The second pitfall is illustrated by two pair of dice, one pair indicating good luck and the other bad luck. This is the kind of uncertainty about which books on probability theory are written. One can write equations and formulas when discussing it, and generally everybody involved will agree with the technical discussions.

"In many practical problems, the only way to analyze the effects of Statistical Uncertainty is to do Monte Carlo calculations. While these are often convenient and useful, there seems to be a definite tendency to exaggerate their importance or necessity. In many cases simpler expected-value calculations would be satisfactory. The work that is saved might be better used in other problems of the analysis... Where Statistical Uncertainty is important, it usually is because it affects Low and High Confidence measures...." (To read more, click here.)

 

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Pitfall #3: Real Uncertainty. Kahn and Mann write: "To avoid possible confusion, we should start this section by mentioning that usually a measure is classified as being High Confidence or Low Confidence, not because of Statistical Uncertainties as implied in the last section, but rather because of a more fundamental kind of uncertainty which we have called Real Uncertainty. This is the kind of uncertainty to which one might possibly assign subjective probabilities, but for which it is impossible to obtain general agreement on the numerical value of these probabilities...." (To read more, click here.)

 

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Pitfall #4: Enemy Reaction. Kahn and Mann write: "It is obvious that our problem would be simplified if the enemy were not trying his hardest to thwart us. Our planning is complex mainly because his reaction and its effect on our design must be considered. In spite of this it is very common to treat the enemy as being supine or inert. Much less common but almost as bad is to treat him as being omnipotent...." (To read more, click here.)

 

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Pitfall #5: Over-Concentration. Kahn and Mann write: "It is usually necessary when studying a component of a larger system to decide what the real problems are so that one can concentrate on them. Unless this is done, the study may be hopelessly complicated. However, there is a real danger that the factoring out of a suitable area will be done carelessly or unskillfully and an overly-narrow viewpoint adopted. Once can then end up by working a wrong or irrelevant problem. We have no objections to the driver in the illustration looking at the blonde--she is worth looking at--but not exclusively...." (To read more, click here.)

 

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Pitfall #6: [Time] Phasing. Kahn and Mann write: "Our picture shows an Air Force officer glancing coyly at the past (Civil War) and the future (Buck Rogers) but not really interested. This is, of course, a fairly serious mistake. One does not buy a military organization from a department store as a unit...." (To read more, click here.)

 

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Pitfall #7: Over-Ambition. Kahn and Mann write: "If one is at all conscientious it is easy to fall into the pitfall of trying to do too big a job. Many of the points raised in discussing Real Uncertainty, Enemy Reaction, Over Concentration and Time Phasing tend to lead the analyst in the direction of increasing the amount of work he has to do. It is, however, immediately apparent that one of the main tricks in turning out a good analysis is to spend a lot of time inventing questions which can be usefully answered within the capabilities and time available...." (To read more, click here.)

 

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Pitfall #8: Fanaticism. Kahn and Mann write: "Fanatacism [sic] is a peculiarly easy and insidious sin. What we are worried about here is not the man with wild hair and rolling eyes and incoherent speech, who has gone wild about some gadget or technique and expects to solve all problems iwth it. It is not that this kind of guy doesn't exist--he does--but he is easy to recognize. His mannerisms and intensity are themselves sufficient to remove him from serious consideration.

"We are thinking here of the completely different kind of problem illustrated by the 'zoot suiter.' The curious thing about the 'zoot suiter' is that in his circles he is considered well dressed; his friends like his clothes. In fact, what we are stressing is not the fanatic individual but the fanatic organization...." (To read more, click here.)

 

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Pitfall #9: Hermitism. Kahn and Mann write: "The problems of communication and persuasion are often ignored though they are central to getting recommendations translated into policy. It is really a question of the proper type of interaction between the analyst and the other parts of the analyst's organization and also between the analyst and the world of policy. A good analysis does four things simultaneously...." (To read more, click here.)

 

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Pitfall #10: Butch. Kahn and Mann write: "The ever-present possibility of a Butch is rarely discussed but is very important. There are two types--the first and obvious one is the classical mistakein arithmetic. This possibility gets worse with the advent of high-speed computing (only now it takes the form of a coding error). This kind of mistake can usually be avoided by careful checking and equally careful qualitative evaluation of the results to see how reasonable they are.

"The second and more insidious kind of Butch is the completely mistaken technical notion or fact. The Systems Analyst, who is doing a broad context study, may have to work with a large number of experts drawn from many fields. It is crucial in dealing with these experts not to accept their statements uncritically, no matter how scholarly and distinguished they are...." (To read more, click here.)

 

Conclusion

Although Kahn and Mann did not end up writing their planned book, Ten Common Pitfalls remains as a suggestion of what might have been. More important, RM-1937 contains some helpful reminders of the foibles of analysis (and the analyst) that can make problem-solving efforts, well, even more problematic.

And, if nothing else, Herman Kahn's illustrations are priceless.

White House Posts POTUS Letter to Congress on US-Turkey Nuclear Deal

The White House's Office of the Press Secretary posted the President's January 23, 2008, letter of transmittal to Congress of an accord to permit civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and Turkey.

Quick background: Before the US can export nuclear goods to a country, American law requires the Executive Branch and the potential importing country to negotiate a special type of agreement (known as a "123 agreement"), and the President to submit this agreement, along with other required assessments, for review by the Legislative Branch. Once this is done, members of Congress have ninety days of "continuous session" to evaluate the agreement and, if they wish to amend or block the agreement, to pass legislation. If nothing happens after those ninety days, then the agreement becomes law of the land.

From the letter of transmittal, two important paragraphs on the deal's long and winding road stand out:

The Agreement was signed on July 26, 2000, and President Clinton approved and authorized execution and made the determinations required by section 123 b. of the Act (Presidential Determination 2000 26, 65 FR 44403 (July 18, 2000)). However, immediately after signature, U.S. agencies received information that called into question the conclusions that had been drawn in the required NPAS [Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement] and the original classified annex, specifically, information implicating Turkish private entities in certain activities directly relating to nuclear proliferation. Consequently, the Agreement was not submitted to the Congress and the executive branch undertook a review of the NPAS evaluation.

[The Bush] Administration has completed the NPAS review as well as an evaluation of actions taken by the Turkish government to address the proliferation activities of certain Turkish entities (once officials of the U.S. Government brought them to the Turkish government's attention). The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy, and the members of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are confident that the pertinent issues have been sufficiently resolved and that there is a sufficient basis (as set forth in the classified annexes, which will be transmitted separately by the Secretary of State) to proceed with congressional review of the Agreement and, if legislation is not enacted to disapprove it, to bring the Agreement into force (Italics added).

The letter of transmittal is obliquely referring to the apparent involvement of Turkish private companies in A. Q. Kahn's proliferation network. (My understanding is that none of these private entities were sanctioned.)

For an interesting essay on Kahn's international network, see Bruno Tertrais' essay, "Kahn's Nuclear Exports: Was There a State Strategy?" in Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War.

Rebooted: Albert Wohlstetter Dot Com

Last week, I launched the redesigned version of Albert Wohlstetter Dot Com, a website that examines the careers, contributions and continuing relevance of Albert Wohlstetter (1913-1997) and Roberta Wohlstetter (1912-2007). Check it out.