2007 NIE on Iran

CNN.com posted the unclassified summary of the US government's National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear capabilities and intentions.

UPDATE (December 4, 2007 @ 6:41 PM CT):

Reporting on the Iran NIE's unclassified key judgments could be better. I made a table to summarize the key judgments, and the intelligence community's confidence-level toward these judgments.

IRAN NIE'S KEY JUDGMENT	CONFIDENCE LEVEL
(A)(1):  Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program at some point in fall 2003.	HIGH
(A)(2):  Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.	MODERATE-to-HIGH
(A)(3):  The international scrutiny and pressure, which followed the discovery of Iran's undeclared nuclear materials and activities, had led Iran to halt its nuclear weapons program in fall 2003 [cf. (A)(1)].	HIGH
(A)(4):  Up until fall 2003, Iranian government had directed military entities to develop nuclear weapons.	HIGH
(A)(5):  Iran's fall 2003 halt of its entire nuclear weapons program [cf. (A)(1)] lasted "at least several years."  (Presumably at least until mid-2007???)	HIGH; MODERATE (ENERGY/NIC)
(A)(6):  As of mid-2007, Iran still had not restarted its nuclear weapons program.	MODERATE
(A)(7):  Iran does not currently have a nuclear weapon.	MODERATE-to-HIGH
(B)(1):  Iran probably imported weapons-usable fissile material.	LOW
(B)(2):  Iran does not have enough weapons-usable fissile material to use in a nuclear weapon.	MODERATE-to-HIGH
(B)(3):  Iran has not produced sufficient amounts of fissile material to use in a nuclear weapon.	HIGH
(C)(1):  Iran faces significant technical problems in operating the centrifuges at Natanz.	MODERATE
(C)(2):  The earliest Iran could be technically capable of producing enough high enriched uranium (HEU) for a nuclear weapons would be late 2009, but this is unlikely.	MODERATE
(C)(3):  Between 2010 and 2015, Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU for a nuclear weapon.  (State/INR, however, judged that Iran is unlikely to achieve this capability before 2013.)	MODERATE
(D)(1):  Since fall 2003, Iran has conducted dual-use research and development projects with commercial and military applications, and some of these projects/applications could have "limited" use for nuclear weapons.	HIGH
(E)(1):  Assuming Iran is still halting its nuclear weapons program, Iran will maintain this halt indefinitely.	INSUFFICIENT INTEL
(E)(2):  Assuming Iran is still halting its nuclear weapons program, Iran has internal criteria and/or deadlines that would prompt it to resume its nuclear weapons program.	INSUFFICIENT INTEL
(E)(3):  Convincing Iran to forgo a nuclear weapons program will be difficult given that Iranian leaders link nuclear weapons to key foreign policy/security goals, and given Iran's previous nuclear weapons program history.	MODERATE
(F)(1):  Iran probably would use covert facilities--not facilities declared to the IAEA--to enrich uranium to HEU for nuclear weapons.	MODERATE
(F)(2):  Iran halted its covert uranium conversion/enrichment efforts in response to its nuclear weapons program halt of fall 2003 [cf. (A)(1)].	NOT CLEARLY STATED
(F)(3):  As of mid-2007, Iran has not restarted its covert uranium conversion/enrichment efforts.	NOT CLEARLY STATED
(G)(1):  By 2015, Iran would have the technical capability to produce/reprocess plutonium for a nuclear weapon.	HIGH
(H)(1):  Iran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity eventually to produce nuclear weapons if it decides to do so.	HIGH

Posted by Robert at December 3, 2007 2:24 PM